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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from the denial of an LC.R. 33 motion to withdraw guilty plea and from
a resentencing after an I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence was granted.

B. Statement of Facts and Proceedings.
1. Backgronnd.

Robert Peterson pleaded guilty to four counts of Possession of Sexually Exploitative
Material For Other Than a Commercial Purpose. LC.§ 18-1507A. On December 4, 2006, the
court imposed a five-year sentence with three years fixed on count 2 and the same sentence as to
count 5 to run concnrrently with connt 2. The court also imposed a five-year sentence with three
years fixed on count 6 and the san1e sentence as to count 9 to run concurrently with count 6. The
sentences in counts 6 and 9 were ordered to run consecutively to the sentences in counts 2 and 5.
R 3-5. The sentences totaled ten years with six years fixed. Mr. Peterson filed a timely Notice of
Appeal. R 6. On March 27, 2007, he filed an LC.R. 35 motion to reconsider the sentence, which
was denied by the district court. The Comt of Appeals affirmed the sentence in an unpublished
opinion, State v. Peterson, No. 33848 (issued November 16, 2007).
2. Rule 35 Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.
On November I 9, 2007, Mr. Peterson filed a prose I.C.R. 35 Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence. R 13. In the motion, he alleged his sentence was illegally imposed pursuant to

Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 564, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). R 14-15. On March 17, 2008, the District
Court heard argument on the motion. First, the court stated that "I think what I ought to do here
is probably appoint an attorney to represent you - a conflict attorney." T (3-17-9009), pg. 9, In.
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7-9. He then entered into a colloquy with Mr. Peterson, without the presence of counsel, asking
him ifhe wanted to have his "sentence be set aside." Mr. Peterson answered that he did. T (317-2009), pg. 11, ln. 21-25. The state then argued that the comi did not have jurisdiction to rule
on the motion since the court had denied a previous Rule 35 motion and that the motion was not
timely. T (3-17-2008), pg. 12, ln. 3 - pg. 13, ln. 2. In response, the coUli stated that it was not
sure if Mr. Peterson could file a second Rule 35 motion, but granted the motion and vacated the
sentence with the proviso that if it did not have the jnrisdiction to consider a Rule 35 motion it
would construe the pleading as a petition for post-conviction relief. T (3-17-2008), pg. 14, In. 21
- pg. 15, In. 25.
The court then suggested that Mr. Peterson might want to disqualify the court from
resentencing him. "In all fairness to, since I have read the psychosexual evaluation without your
being advised of your rights. You would probably move to want me to disqualify myself?" Mr.
Peterson responded, "I appreciate that self-disqualification. Yes sir, I would make that motion."
Judge McDern1ott granted the motion and assigned the case to Judge Harding. T (3-17-2009),
pg. 16, In. 4-10; R 34.
The court later clarified its order stating that it was considering the prose motion an
I.C.R. 35 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. It wrote:
Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby GRANTS the Defendant's request to
modify its previous Minute Entry and Order to reflect to have his sentence set
aside as a valid Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence and not as a motion
for post conviction relief. Because a motion to correct an illegal sentence may be
submitted at any time and is not limited to one filing, the Defendant's motion to
set aside his illegal sentence was granted pursuant to Rule 35.
R44.
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3. Motion to Disqualify Judge and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
On March 26, 2008, Mr. Peterson filed a motion to disqualify Judge Harding pursuant to
I.C.R. 25(a). R 37. The court denied this motion because it found that Mr. Peterson "ha[d]
already disqualified one judge pursuant to ICR 25(a)." R 39. Mr. Peterson moved for
reconsideration. R 48.
He also filed an Amended Motion to Withdraw Plea. He argued that he need only show a
"just reason" to withdraw his plea as the motion was made prior to sentencing, and that granting
the motion would not prejudice the state. R 61. 1 However, the basis for the withdrawal actually
went to the higher "manifest injustice" standard. He argued that "counsel [did not] adequately
explain the charges, evidence, facts and circumstances of the case with him to allow Mr. Peterson
to make an info1med decision." And further, the colloquies between the Court and Mr. Peterson
were inadequate to meet the requirements ofI.C.R. l l(c). Therefore, the record did not show
that the plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Finally, Mr. Peterson argued
that there was a just cause to withdraw the plea because both court and counsel failed to explain
to him that a guilty plea to the charges would require him to register as a sex offender. R 63.
On May 15, 2008, the court heard Mr. Peterson's Motion for Reconsideration on the
Motion to Disqualify and a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. T (5-15-2008) pg. 1, In. 13-16.

1

Mr. Peterson anticipates that the state may argue that the original sentence was not an
illegal sentence for purposes of Rule 35. See State v. Alsanea, 138 ldaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d 153,
165 (Ct. App. 2003) ("An illegal sentence under Rule 35 is one in excess of a statutory provision
or otherwise contrary to applicable law."). And, therefore, Mr. Peterson's Rule 33 motion is
untimely. See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003). However, the Order granting
the Rule 35 may not be challenged by the state on appeal because it did not file a cross appeal.
See State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372,377, 195 P.3d 731, 736 (Ct. App. 2008) (State's
argument seeking affirmative relief on defendant's appeal, without having filed a cross-appeal, is
not permissible unless the issue raised is one of subject matter jurisdiction.).
3

Mr. Peterson argued that his motion to reconsider should be granted because: 1) Judge
McDermott actuaJly voluntarily disqualified himself from further consideration under I.C.R.
25(d) and the LC.R. 25(a) motion to disqualify Judge Harding without cause was therefore not
the second such motion; 2) that Judge McDermott was required to disqualify himself under

LC.R. 25(b) because he had read the sentencing material obtained in violation of Estrada; and 3)
Mr. Peterson's acquiescence in Judge McDermott's suggestion should not be binding because
Mr. Peterson was acting prose and appointed counsel would not have used the LC.R. 25(a)
motion to disqualify Judge McDermott, as the judge was plainly going to disqualify himself. T
(5-15-2008) pg. 2, In. 3 - pg. 4, In. 4. These arguments were based upon the transcript of the
March 7, 2008, hearing described above, which was placed into the record. R 67-72.
The court denied the motion to reconsider. It found that Judge McDermott was not
required to disqualify himself and that Mr. Peterson made the motion to disqualify Judge
McDermott. T (5-15-2008) pg. 4, ln. 8 - pg. 5, ln. 6.
Mr. Peterson then argued his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He first argued "his
counsel didn't explain any of his offense to him. Didn't explain the charges, the evidence, the
facts, the circumstances of the case, and therefore couldn't make an informed decision." T (5-152008) pg. 10, ln. 10-23. Further, he suggested that the trial transcript raised a question of
whether the trial court complied with LC.R. l l(c). T (5-15-2008) pg. 11, In. 6-12. He also
argued that the plea should be withdrawn because he was not informed that a guilty plea would
require him to register as a sex offender. T (5-15-2008) pg. 10, ln. 10-13.
The court also denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. It found that based upon
"what happened at the time he entered that plea of guilty," there was no just reason to allow Mr.
4

Peterson to withdraw his pleas. T (5-15-2008) pg. 21, In. 12 - pg. 24, ln. 9.
4. Sentencing.
After denying the above motions, the court proceeded to sentencing. It imposed a fiveyear sentence with two years fixed on each of the four counts with each sentence to be served
consecutively to the others. T(5-15-2008)pg. 56, ln. 1-3. This, in effect, doubled the
indeterminate sentence previously imposed. While Judge McDennott' s combined sentence was
ten years with six years fixed, Judge Harding's sentence is twenty years with eight years fixed.
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 79.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A Did the court err in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea as the plea was not
constitutionally valid and as there was a just reason to grant the motion?
B. Did the court violate Mr. Peterson's state and federal constitutional rights to the
assistance of counsel when it granted Mr. Peterson's prose "motion" to disqualify Judge
McDermott in the absence of counsel or a valid waiver of counsel?
C. Did the court err in denying the motion to disqualify Judge Harding without cause as
the prior "motion" to disqualify Judge McDermott was not an I.C.R. 25(a) motion?
D. Did the court violate Mr. Peterson's due process rights under the state and federal
constitutions by increasing his sentence after he was successful in his Rule 35 motion?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Court Erred in Denying the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea.

l. Standard of Review.

The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

5

State v. Litz, 122 Idaho 387,388,834 P.2d 904, 905 (Ct. App. 1992). When a defendant seeks to
withdraw a guilty plea, the first question is whether the plea was constitutionally valid. If not,
withdrawal should be granted. "If a plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due
process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently, then 'manifest injustice' or the lower standard of 'just reason' will be established as
a matter of law." State v. Stone, - Idaho-, -

P.3d-, 2009 WL 689878 *2 (Ct. App. 2009)

citing State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007); State v. Shook, 144 Idaho
858, 859, 172 P.3d 1133, 1134 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d
879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002). But even in cases where the plea was constitutionally valid, the court
must go on to decide whether withdrawal should nevertheless be allowed as a matter of
discretion. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 512,516, 861 P.2d 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. State,
118 Idaho 842, 844, 801 P.2d 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1990). "[A] constitutional defect in the plea is not
necessary in order to show either a 'just reason' or 'manifest injustice.'" Stone, supra, citing

State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Henderson, 113
Idaho 411,413, 744 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1987).

If a defendant establishes a just cause for withdrawal of the plea, the motion should be
granted unless the state demonstrates that prejudice would result. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho
799, 802, 761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1988), citing State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 744 P.2d 795
(Ct. App. 1987) ("In granting or denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing
has occurred, the district court is empowered with broad discretion, liberal exercise of which is
encouraged." 113 Idaho at 414, 744 P.2d at 798 (citations omitted).) A motion made after
sentencing may be granted only to correct a manifest injustice. I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114
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Idaho 799, 801, 761 P.2d 1151, 1154 (1988).

In reviewing a district court decision for an abuse of discretion, "the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it;
and (3) whether the comi reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hanslovan, Idaho-, -P.3d- 2008 WL 2512529 (Ct. App. 2008), citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,
600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
2. Why Relief Should be Granted.

In this case, the district court abused its discretion by failing to act "consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it" and by failing to reach "its decision
by an exercise of reason." Id. In particular, the District Court reviewed only the guilty plea
questionnaire and concluded that "because a person doesn't like what happened at sentencing, or
what happens in the recommendation ofa Presentence Repo1i, isn't a just cause, and I don't
believe there is any just cause reason." T (5-15-2008) pg. 23, ln, 14 - pg. 24, ln. 9.
(a) Mr. Peterson established that a manifest injustice would result if the motion was not
granted.

The District Court did not go beyond the guilty plea questionnaire to determine whether
the record as a whole showed there was a constitutionally valid plea. Had it done so, it would
have found that Mr. Peterson was never info1med of the nature of the charge against him as
required by I.C.R l l(c)(4).
The due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions require that a defendant's
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plea be entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244
(1969) (Fourteenth Amendment); State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 35, 557 P.2d 626,629 (1976).
Therefore, a plea must be entered with "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence." Brooks v. State, 108 Idaho 855, 857, 702 P.2d 893, 895 (Ct. App. 1985).
Moreover, the record must disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered
his pleas of guilty. Boykin, supra. To that end, the trial court must follow the minimum
requirements ofidaho Criminal Rule 11 (c) before accepting guilty pleas.
More particularly, the United States Supreme Court has held that a plea of guilty cannot
be voluntary unless the defendant receives "real notice of the true nature of the charge against
him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process." Henderson v.

Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976), quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). A plea
of guilty that is not voluntary cannot support a judgment of conviction. Henderson v. Morgan,

supra. Here, however, the record does not show that Mr. Peterson was ever informed of the
nature of the charge against him. Mr. Peterson waived his preliminary hearing. R (#33848) 59.
(A motion for judicial notice of the clerk's record and transcripts in State v. Robert Peterson,
Docket No. 33848 is filed contemporaneously with this brief.) He waived the reading of the
reading of the Information at arraignment. T (9-18-2006) pg. 7, In. 24-pg. 25, In. 2. The court's
guilty plea questionnaire did not advise Mr. Peterson of the nature of the charge, nor did he admit
therein he had been so infonned by his attorney or anyone else. R (#33848) 68-69. Finally, the
district court did not inform him at the change of plea hearing. T (10-16-2006) pg. 7, In. 1 - pg.
20, In. 5.
While Mr. Peterson read the prosecutor's information before the plea, that alone is not
8

sufficient to give him notice of the nature of the charge. As to the four counts Mr. Peterson
pleaded guilty to, the infmmation generically states: "That the said ROBERT E. PETERSON, a
person over the age of eighteen, in the County of Bannock, State ofidaho, on or about the 25 th [or
22 nd ] day of February, 2006, did knowingly and willfully possess sexually exploitative material,
to wit: movie clip, for other than a commercial purpose." R (#33848) 64-65. Nowhere does the
information provide notice to Mr. Peterson of what "sexually exploitative materials" are and the
term itself is not so clear as to give notice without such an explanation. See United States v.
Wetter/in, 583 F.2d 346, 350 (7 th Cir. 1978) (stating that charge of"conspiracy" is not a

self-explanatory legal term so simple in meaning that it can be expected or assumed that a lay
person understands it); accord United States v. Darling, 766 F.2d 1095, 1099 (7 th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552 (9 th Cir. 1992) (Brief and vague explanation of the

information, by the court, did not satisfy requirement that defendant be infom1ed of the nature of
the charge to which the plea is offered.).
In fact, the nature of a conspiracy charge is straightforward and easily understandable
when compared to the nature of "sexually exploitative material." Idaho Code § 18-1507 A(2), the
charge here, does not even define the term, instead referring to the definition "in section 181507." Subsection (2)(k) of that statute provides that "'[s]exually exploitative material' means
any photograph, motion picture, videotape, print, negative, slide, or other mechanically,
electronically, or chemically reproduced visual material which depicts a child engaged in,
participating in, observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct." (Emphasis added.)
"Explicit sexual conduct" is defined in subsection (f) as: "sexual intercourse, erotic fondling,
erotic nudity, masturbation, sadomasochism, sexual excitement, or bestiality." (Emphasis added.)
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Then each of the italicized tenns is given its own definition. LC.§ 18-1507(2)(a), (d)-G). 2
In light of the complex nature of the offense, it cannot be said that the record shows that
Mr. Peterson was informed of the nature of the charge merely because he had read the
prosecutor's information. As the Wetter/in Court observed, the defendant "reading the
indictment clearly does nothing to establish on the record that the court personally detennined

2

The term "sexual intercourse" is defined as "real or simulated intercourse, whether
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, between persons of the same or opposite
sex, or between a human and an animal, or with an artificial genital."
"Erotic fondling" is defined as
touching a person's clothed or unclothed genitals or pubic area, developing or
undeveloped genitals or pubic area (if the person is a child), buttocks, breasts (if
the person is a female), or developing or undeveloped breast area (if the person is
a female child), for the purpose ofreal or simulated overt sexual gratification or
stimulation of one (1) or more of the persons involved. 'Erotic fondling' shall not
be construed to include physical contact, even if affectionate, which is not for the
purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or stimulation of one (1) or
more of the persons involved.
"Erotic nudity" is defined as
the display of the human male or female genitals or pubic area, the undeveloped
or developing genitals or pubic area of the human male or female child, the human
female breasts, or the undeveloped or developing breast area of the human female
child, for the purpose ofreal or simulated overt sexual gratification or stimulation
of one (1) or more of the persons involved.
"Masturbation" is defined as
the real or simulated touching, rubbing, or otherwise stimulating of a person's own
clothed or unclothed genitals or pubic area, developing or undeveloped genitals or
pubic area (if the person is a child), buttocks, breasts (if the person is a female), or
developing or undeveloped breast area (if the person is a female child), by manual
manipulation or self-induced or with an artificial instrument, for the purpose of
real or simulated oveit sexual gratification or arousal of the person.
"Sadomasochism" is defined as the:
(i) Real or simulated flagellation or torture for the purpose of real or simulated
sexual stimulation or gratification; or
(ii) The real or simulated condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise
physically restrained for sexual stimulation or gratification of a person.
"Sexual excitement" means "the real or simulated condition of human male or female genitals
when in a state of real or simulated overt sexual stimulation or arousal." Finally, "'Bestiality'
means a sexual connection in any manner between a human being and any animal."
10

that the defendant understood the nature of the charges." 583 F.2d at 350, n. 6. Federal Courts
in implementing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 agree that the mere reading of an
indictment will usually not suffice to inform the defendant of the nature of the offense. See, e.g.,

United States v. Boatright, 588 F.2d 471,473 (5 th Cir. 1979). "To inform a defendant of the
nature of the charge must mean more than having the indictment read to the defendant. Reading
the indictment informs the defendant of the technical charge. . . . . In most cases only the most
sophisticated defendant would be informed of the nature of the charge by a reading of the
indictment without more." United States v. Adams, 566 F.2d 962, 967 (5 th Cir. 1978). "Charges
of a complex nature, including esoteric terms unfamiliar to the lay mind, may require more
explication" by the bench. United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931,938 (5 th Cir. 1979),

superseded by rule change on other grounds as stated in United States v. Johnson, I F.3d 296
(5 th Cir. 1993). Consequently, the court here did not comply with I.C.R.l l(c)(4) and the plea is
constitutionally invalid. Therefore, Mr. Peterson established both a "manifest injustice" and a
"just reason" as a matter oflaw. State v. Stone, supra. See also State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428,
432, 885 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that where a guilty plea is shown to be
constitutionally invalid, leave to withdraw the plea is constitutionally mandated).

(b) Mr. Peterson established a just reason to grant the motion.
After erroneously determining the guilty plea was valid, the district court did not go on to
consider Mr. Peterson's other arguments why a just reason to withdraw the plea existed. This
failure to even consider the claims was an abuse of discretion because the court did not reach its
decision by an exercise of reason. Further, the error was not harmless because there was a just
reason to grant the motion as the record shows that Mr. Peterson was not informed that a guilty
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plea would result in him being required to register as a sex offender. There was no such
advisement by the court at the arraignment or change of plea hearing; nor was there one in the
guilty plea questionnaire.
Mr. Peterson acknowledges that in 2006, the time of the change of plea here, Idaho
Courts were not required to inform defendants that a plea of guilty might trigger sex offender
registration requirements. LC.R. 11 (2006); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,982 P.2d 931 (1999) (the
duty to register as a sex offender is a collateral, not a direct consequence of a guilty plea). That
changed in 2007 when the Supreme Court amended I.C.R. 11 to add the requirement that "[t]he
district judge shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the making of factual admissions during a
plea colloquy, instruct on the following .... (2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense
requiring registration on the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the defendant of such
registration requirements." I.C.R. l l(d)(2). And, that was the rule in effect at the time of the
hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In sum, while such advisement was not
required in 2006, the failure to so advise is still a just reason to permit withdrawal in 2008.
The above is confirmed by the history of the rule change. In 2006, the Criminal Rules
Advisory Committee "recommend[ ed] to the Supreme Court the adoption of an amendment to
Rule 11 to read as follows:
The district judge shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the making of
(d)
factual admissions during a plea colloquy, provide notice of the following
collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea or factual admissions, as follows:
(1)
The court shall inform all defendants that if the defendant is not a citizen
of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual admissions could
have consequences of deportation or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the
United States, or denial of an application for United States citizenship. Failure of
the court to provide this notice shall not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty
12

(2)
If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense requiring registration on
the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the defendant of such notification
requirements. Failure to so notify the defendant shall not be grounds for
withdrawal of the guilty plea.

If the defendant is waiving his right to appeal or other post-conviction
(3)
proceedings as part of his guilty plea, and such condition of the plea has been
called to the attention of the court, the court shall confinn with the defendant his
awareness of the waiver of appeal or other proceedings. Failure of the court to
confirm this waiver with the defendant shall not of itself be grounds for
withdrawal of the guilty plea, but shall not prohibit the defendant from otherwise
demonstrating that his plea was involuntary for failure to understand the
conditions of his plea agreement.
Minutes of the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee from November 13, 2006 (attached hereto as
Appendix A for the convenience of Court and counsel) (underlining added). Thus, the
Committee's proposal was to advise defendants of the sex offender registration requirement, but
not to allow the failure to advise to become a basis to withdraw the guilty plea. However, the
Supreme Court rejected the Committee's suggestion and omitted the underlined text from the
final amended rule. The Supreme Court's rejection of the Advisory Committee's proposed text
strongly supports the conclusion that the failure to properly advise a defendant of the sex
offender registration is a just reason to withdraw a plea. See Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
113 Idaho 609,614, 747 P.2d 18, 23 (1987) (When the legislature amends a statute it is deemed,
absent an express indication to the contrary, to be indicative of changed legislative intent.) and
Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298,299, 715 P.2d 968, 969 (1986) (When a statute is amended it is

presumed that the legislature intended the statute to have a meaning different from the meaning
accorded the statute before amendment.)
As the court rejected the notion that a just reason could exist even if a guilty plea was
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constitutionally valid, it abused its discretion by failing to apply the proper standard to the
decision before it and because its decision was not made by an exercise of reason. The order
denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas must be reversed and the matter remanded.
B. The Court Deprived Mr. Peterson of the Assistance of Counsel at a Critical Stage of
the Proceedings When It Elicited a Pro Se "Motion" to Disqualify Judge McDermott and Then
Granted the Motion.
1. Standard of Review.
In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Supreme held that relief must be

granted under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in three circumstances: (1) where there is a
"complete denial" of counsel at a critical stage of trial; (2) where "counsel entirely fails to subject
the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing"; and (3) where, "although counsel is
available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent
one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate.

Id. at 659; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002). This case falls into the first
circumstance.
The question of whether Mr. Peterson was deprived of his right to counsel was not
presented below, but this Court should review the claim under the fundamental error doctrine.
"[T]his Court traditionally has reviewed 'fundamental' errors on appeal, even when no objection
was raised at trial. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,486 P.2d 260 (1971). An error is fundamental
when it 'so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the
accused of his fundamental right to due process."' State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170
P.3d 886,891 (2007) quoting State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). See

State v. Yakovac, !45 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.3d 476,482 (2008) (claim of ineffective assistance of
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counsel may be fundamental error, but fundamental error doctrine does not permit appellant from
relitigating claim already rnled upon in post-conviction petition).
2. Why Relief Should be Granted.
When Mr. Peterson filed his Rule 35 motion, he also filed a Motion and Affidavit for
Appointment of Counsel. R 17-23. On November 19, 2007, the Court appointed the public
defender and set a December 17, 2007, hearing date. ROA, pg. 5 (in Clerk's Record). On
December 17, Mr. Peterson appeared with counsel, John Dewey. The court pennitted Mr. Dewey
to withdraw and appointed attorney John Souza. R 25. A hearing was held without Mr. Peterson
being present and Mr. Peterson moved to proceed prose. On February 4, 2008, Mr. Souza was
permitted to withdraw. R 30.
Judge McDern1ott presided over the LC.R. 35 motion. At the hearing, the court inquired
as to Mr. Peterson's desire to be represented.
THE COURT:

You have advised this Comi that you don't want an attorney to represent
you; correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, based on past experience with not being present at a hearing, I
feel compelled to waive my right to an attorney.
THE COURT:

Well, I don't want you to think you ought to be
compelled to do anything, you know. The attorneys
have been trained in the law, Mr. Peterson, and to
have you represent yourself - you know the old
saying, don't you?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm very aware of that, yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

So -

THE DEFENDANT: And it's usually very apt. And this is a last resort THE COURT:

Well, I think what I ought to do here is probably appoint you an attorney to
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represent you - a conflict attorney.
T (3-17-2008), pg. 8, In. 8 - pg. 9, In. 9.
The court, however, proceeded to rule on the merits of the Rule 35 motion without counsel
being present, notwithstanding the absence of a valid waiver. (See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834 (1975) (While defendant has a iight to self-representation, such a decision amounts to a
waiver of the right to counsel and therefore the defendant should be made aware of the problems
inherent in self-representation so that such waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.). To
waive counsel, defendant must "knowingly and intelligently forgo" the benefits of counsel and
"should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record
will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Idaho also requires that waiver be effected voluntarily. State v. Dalrymple,
144 Idaho 628, 167 P.3d 765 (2007); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278,289
(2003).) The actions of the district comi violated Mr. Peterson's right to counsel.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all
"critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
224 (1967). In determining whether a particular stage is "critical," it is necessary "to analyze
whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice." Wade, 388 U.S. at 227, 87 S.Ct. at 1932,
18 L.Ed.2d at 1157. For example, sentencing has been deemed a critical stage. See e.g., Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) and Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792,796,874 P.2d 603,607
(Ct. App. 1994).
Here, at the Rule 35 hearing, the Court decided to appoint conflict counsel for Mr.
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Peterson. T (3-17-2008) pg. 9, In. 7-10. The Court then granted the Rule 35 motion. T (3-172008) pg. 14, In. 22. After doing so and noting that he had already read the psychosexual
evaluation, Judge McDennott asked whether "you would probably move to want me to disqualify
myself?" Mr. Peterson responded: "I appreciate that self-disqualification, sir. Yes, sir, I would
make that motion." The court then said: "Okay sir. I'll disqualify myself from sentencing." T (317-2008) pg. 16, In. 4-16. In doing so, the Court made an important decision while Mr. Peterson
was not represented by counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
While this constitutional issue was not presented to the trial court, this Court should
review the claim under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748,
170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). The error here was fundamental because the Court will presume
prejudice when there is an actual or constructive denial of counsel in a criminal proceeding. Roe

v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,482 (2000); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Therefore,
the sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded to Judge McDermott for further
proceedings.
C. The Court Further Erred by Denying the Motion to Disqualify Judge Harding and
the Motion to Reconsider.
1. Standard of Review.

Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a) provides that "[i]n all criminal cases ... the parties shall each
have the right to one disqualification without cause of the judge or magistrate[.]" Here, Judge
Harding denied the Rule 25(a) motion because he found that Mr. Peterson had previously moved
to disqualify Judge McDennott. T (5-15-2008) pg. 4, In. 18-23 ("The wording in it [Mr.
Peterson's "motion"] leaves a little bit to be desired but I view that as a motion by Mr. Peterson
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for Judge McDennott to disqualify himself.") That question is one of law, i.e., whether the
undisputed facts show a prior I.C.R. 25(a) motion, which this Court should review de novo. See

State v. Sanchez, - Idaho-, -

P.3d-., 2009 WL 1406996 *2 (Ct. App. 2009) (question of

law given free review).
2. Why Relief Should be Granted.
Judge McDermott's disqualification was actually a voluntary disqualification under I.C.R.
25(c). That was certainly how Mr. Peterson interpreted it, as he thanked the judge for
disqualifying himself. ("I appreciate that self-disqualification, sir. Yes, sir, I would make that
motion." T (3-17-2008) pg. 16, In. 9-11.) To the extent that Mr. Peterson, who was acting without
appointed counsel being present, could be said to have made a motion, it was a 25(b )(4) motion
for disqualification for bias or prejudice as Judge McDermott had informed him that it would not
be fair for him to do the resentencing "since I have read the psychosexual evaluation."
Accordingly, Judge Harding erred in denying the I.C.R. 25(a) motion to disqualify himself
as Mr. Peterson had not made a prior motion to disqualify without cause.

D. The Court's Unjustified Increase of the Sentence Should be Vacated Because it is
Presumptively Vindictive and Violates Due Process.
As this Court previously found in State v. Peterson, supra, the original sentence in this
case was not unreasonable. Judge Harding then doubled the indetenninate time from ten to
twenty years and increased the fixed time by a quarter from six to eight years. The judge,
however, did not justify the increase in the sentence and the presumption arises that he did so to
punish Mr. Peterson for successfully challenging the original sentence. This vindictive sentencing
violated the dne process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court said in North
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Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969)3, supra:
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence
he receives after a new trial. And since fear of such vindictiveness may
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally
attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of
apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.

In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new
trial, the reasons for him doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must
be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of
the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing. And the factual
data upon which the increased sentence is based must be part of the record, so that
the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on
appeal.
395 U.S. at 725-26 ( emphasis added).

If the Court does not grant the relief requested above, it still should modify the sentence
back to the original sentence often years with six years fixed because of the Pearce presumption.
Judge Harding did not point to any affirmative evidence to justify the higher sentence. There
being no evidence at all, it follows perforce that the record does not contain objective information
concerning identifiable conduct occurring after the time of the original sentencing to justify the
much longer sentence. Compare State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527,530, 850 P.2d 176, 179 (1993).

V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Peterson asks that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas and remand for a trial. Alternatively, the court should vacate the
sentences due to the e1Tors regarding the disqualification of the judges and remand for further
proceedings. As a second alternative, this Court should reinstate Judge McDermott's original

3

Overruled in other circumstances in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
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sentences.
Respectfully submitted this

l ~ day of June, 2009.

llitA-R K4v1.~:-,,
Dennis B~njamin
Attorney for Robert Peterson
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ID 83720-0010.
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APPENDIX A

Criminal Rules Advisory Committee
Minutes from Meeting of November 13, 2006
Present: Justice Roger Burdick, Chair; Judge Penny Friedlander, Judge Stephen
Calhoun, Judge James Cawthon, Am1 Marie Kelso, Ken Jorgensen, Scott Axline, Art
Bistline, Gar Hackney, Denise Rosen, Amil Myshin, Roger Bourne, Molly Huskey, Sara
Thomas, Grant Loebs, and Cathy Derden.
Plea Advisories. At its last meeting in January, the Committee considered whether the
court should be required to advise defendants of certain collateral consequences of their
plea of guilty before taking the plea; specifically, the chance of deportation and the
requirement to register as a sex offender. The Committee came to a consensus that this
should be done and appointed a subcommittee chaired by Judge Cawthon to draft a
specific proposal for presentation at this meeting.
In addition, Monica Schurtman, the supervising attorney for the Immigration Clinic at the
University of Idaho College of Law, sent in a proposal that she and her students had
drafted, addressing an advisory on immigration consequences that would be given both at
arraignment and at the time of entering the plea. At the invitation of Justice Burdick,
Professor Schurtman attended the meeting along with Maria Andrade, a local attorney
who handles immigration cases, to discuss immigration issues that arise from entering a
plea of guilty to ce1iain offenses.

In 1996 and 1997 Congress expanded the immigration consequences of a criminal
conviction and expanded the definition of a conviction to include convictions that were
expunged, as well as factual admissions made in connection with a charge even if there
was no conviction on that charge. The list of what is considered an aggravated felony for
deportation purposes is vast so that even climes that are considered misdemeanors under
state law and that carry only a minor penalty or no jail time may still be included. Both
Schurtman and Andrade stated they had handled cases where persons had plead guilty to
crimes and later been deported, without ever having been advised or having realized the
consequences of their pleas. Andrade argued a post-conviction case on this issue last
week and both see it as an issue that is being raised more frequently.
The proposal by the Immigration law Clinic was first to amend Rule 10 on arraigrrments
by adding a new subsection (c) as follows:

(c) Notice of possible immigration consequences.
At the time of criminal arraignment, each defendant shall be informed
that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, the entry of any
plea or making of any factual admission may affect his or her
immigration status.
In each case, including those involving
misdemeanor charges, the court shall advise each defendant of his or
her right to consult with au attorney if he or she needs additional
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information concerning the potential immigration consequences of his
or her criminal case.

The purpose of advising at arraignment would be to let persons know of this possible
consequence early in the process. In addition, in many counties indigent defendants may
go to arraignment without an attorney and if it's a misdemeanor where the court is not
going to impose jail time may be asked if they wish to plead at that time. This happens
without the person ever realizing the offense may be one that carries immigration
consequences. Giving this advisory at arraignment would help alert defendants and
attorneys to the issue. Another reason for advising at this state is that factual admissions
made at this time may lead to deportation or an inability to naturalize even if the person
is not convicted.
The Committee later voted against the proposal to amend Rule 10. The Committee first
struck the second sentence, noting subsection (b) of the rule already advised the
defendant of the right to an attorney. The Committee then discussed that if the concern is
that persons might plead guilty without an advisory then that should be remedied by the
fact that the Committee intended to recommend that an advisory on immigration
consequences be given before a plea is taken. If at that time the person realizes more
time is needed to talk to an attorney before pleading then the defendant can request more
time.
The Immigration Law Clinic submitted three proposals for amendments to Rule 11 on
plea advisories.
Proposal I is based on an Arizona statute and sets out the exact wording of the advisory.
It also provides for the defendant to have time to reconsider the appropriateness of the
plea in light of the advisement. It would be a new subsection that reads as follows:
(d) Prior to acceptance of any plea to an offense punishable as a
crime, the court shall administer the following advisal on the record
to the defendant:
"If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are advised that
conviction of any criminal offense, including conviction by entry of
any plea, and even where the conviction is later expunged, may have
the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the
United States."

(e) Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant a reasonable
amount of additional time to consider the appropriateness of the plea
in light of the advisement. If the court fails to advise the defendant as
required by subsection (d) and the defendant shows that conviction of
the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty may have the
consequences for the defendant of deportation, exclusion from the
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United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the
United States, the court, on defendant's motion, shall vacate the
judgment aud permit the defendant to withdraw the plea and enter a
plea of not guilty. Absent record that the court provided the
advisement required by subsection (d), the defendant shall be
presumed not to have received the required advisement. At uo time is
the defendant required to disclose his or her immigration status.
Proposal II contains no actual recitation of the advisory and would be a new subsection
under Rule 11 (c) on acceptance of a guilty plea that would read as follows:

(6) Before the court accepts any plea of guilty, the court shall advise
the defendant that (1) by entering the plea, if the defendant is not a
United States citizen, the defendant may face additional consequences
of deportation or removal, detention, exclusion from readmission to
the United States, or ineligibility for citizenship and (2) that the
defendant may consult with counsel if the defendant needs additional
information concerning the potential consequences of the plea or of a
conviction following trial. At no time is the defendant required to
disclose his or her immigration status. Failure of the court to provide
notice regarding potential immigration consequences shall not be
grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea unless the defendant shows
he or she is likely to suffer deportation, exclusion of admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization; and the guilty plea or
factual admission made in the criminal case at issue is likely to be
considered in relation to such action of deportation, exclusion of
admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization.
Proposal III is what the clinic considers to be the bare minimum and is a paragraph that
would come under Rule 11 (c) on acceptance of a guilty plea.
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including
minimum and maximum punishments, other direct consequences which
may apply, and that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, a
plea or conviction may have immigration consequences. At no time is
the defendant required to disclose his or her immigration status.
Failure of the court to provide notice shall not be grounds for
withdrawal of the plea unless the defendant shows he or she is likely
to suffer deportation, exclusion of admission to the United States, or
denial of naturalization; and the guilty plea or factual admission
made in the criminal case at issue is likely to be considered in relation
to such action of deportation, exclusion of admission to the United
States, or denial of naturalization.

It was noted that once a defendant is advised there might be immigration consequences,
he or she is going to want to know specifically what those are for his or her offense, and
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there was concern that defense attorneys would not be able to properly advise on this,
leading to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Right now it is not considered
ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to advise as to a collateral consequence. Both
Schurtman and Andrade advised that there is a trend developing in cases that indicates
courts are more willing to recognize that even if immigration consequences are
considered collateral it is still not reasonable for counsel not to tell clients about this
possibility. Some courts are finding attorneys have a duty to inform since deportation
leads to loss of jobs and separation of families. They also noted that often attorneys
never ask a client questions about citizenship, as seen recently in several cases involving
Canadians. You can be a legal resident and still be deported.
Molly Huskey advised that the SAPD's office had sent one of their attorneys to training
on immigration issues and that there were some charts being developed by immigration
attorneys listing offenses that could be considered as aggravated felonies or crimes of
moral turpitude. There are also special resource centers that can be contacted for the
infonnation.
It was noted by Molly Huskey and Grant Loebs that under a new federal law, the Adams
Walsh Act, that sex offender registration has been extremely broadened to encompass
offenses where a minor is involved even if there is no allegation of sexual contact and
that states are directed to comply. Thus, immigration consequences and sex offender
registration are both areas that are affecting more people.

Proposal II is the closest of the three proposals to the proposal presented by the
subcommittee. The following is the subcommittee's proposal:
Proposed amendment to I.C.R. 11

Add:
(d)
The district judge shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the
making of factual admissions during a plea colloquy, provide notice of
the following collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea or
factual admissions, as follows:
(1)
The court shall inform all defendants that if the defendant is
not a naturalized citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or
making of factual admissions could have consequences of deportation,
exclusion of admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization. Failure of the court to provide this notice shall not be
grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea unless the defendant shows
that the defendant is likely to suffer deportation, exclusion of
admission to the United States or denial of naturalization; and the
guilty plea or factual admission made in the criminal case at issue is
likely to be considered in relation to such action of deportation,
exclusion of admission to the United States or denial of naturalization.
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(2)
If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense reqmrmg
registration on the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the
defendant of such notification requirements. Failure to so notify the
defendant shall not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea.
(3)
If the defendant is waiving his right to appeal or other postconviction proceedings as part of his guilty plea, and such condition of
the plea has been called to the attention of the court, the court shall
confirm with the defendant his awareness of the waiver of appeal or
other proceedings. Failure of the court to confirm this waiver with
the defendant shall not of itself be grounds for withdrawal of the
guilty plea, but shall not prohibit the defendant from otherwise
demonstrating that his plea was involuntary for failure to understand
the conditions of his plea agreement.

Current subsection (d) would then be re-designated as (e).
Andrade had several suggestions as to language used in this proposal:
Strike the word "naturalize" from the first sentence. Use the word "removal" in
conjunction with the word "deportation". The INS now uses the word "removal" but
everyone is more familiar with "deportation". Instead of "exclusion of admission to the
United States" substitute "inability to obtain legal status in the United States". Instead of
"denial of naturalization" substitute "denial of an application for U.S. citizenship".
After the presentation, the Committee reviewed the proposals. The Committee feared
requiring the exact wording of an advisory would lead to too many claims of error. The
focus then turned to the proposal by the subcommittee that was similar to proposal II
from the clinic. The Committee voted to accept the changes to the language that were
proposed by Andrade.
The proposal from the subcommittee addresses not only immigration consequences but
also sex offender registration as well as waiver of the right to appeal. Discussion then
focused on the last sentence in each paragraph dealing with the failure to give the
advisory. The proposal states that failure to give the advisory is not grounds for
withdrawal of the plea but gives an exception in paragraph one if the defendant could
show he was likely to suffer deportation and the guilty plea was likely to be considered in
that proceeding. There was discussion as to whether this would somehow extend the
time for making a motion to withdraw a plea. However, a motion to withdraw a plea
would still be made under I.C.R. 33 and case law has established the jurisdictional time
limits for this motion. The proposal speaks to a possible new ground for a motion but
does not extend the time.
There was a motion to amend the language in subsection one as to the immigration
advisory so that it would simply state "the failure of the court to provide this notice shall
not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea". This motion passed.
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The Committee then voted to recommend to the Supreme Court the adoption of an
amendment to Rule 11 to read as follows:

(d)
The district judge shall, prior to eutry of a guilty plea or the
making of factual admissions during a plea colloquy, provide notice of
the following collateral consequences of entering a guilty plea or
factual admissions, as follows:
(1)
The court shall inform all defeudants that if the defendaut is
not a citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of
factual admissions could have consequences of deportation or
removal, inability to obtain legal status in the United States, or denial
of an application for United States citizenship. Failure of the court to
provide this notice shall not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty
plea.
If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offeuse requiring
registration ou the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the
defendant of such notification requirements. Failure to so notify the
defendant shall not be grounds for withdrawal of the guilty plea.
(2)

If the defendant is waiving his right to appeal or other postconviction proceedings as part of his guilty plea, and such condition of
the plea has been called to the attention of the court, the court shall
confirm with the defendant his awareness of the waiver of appeal or
other proceedings. Failure of the court to confirm this waiver with
the defendant shall not of itself be grounds for withdrawal of the
guilty plea, but shall not prohibit the defendant from otherwise
demonstrating that his plea was involuntary for failure to understand
the conditions of his plea agreement.
(3)

Guilty Plea Advisory Form. The Rule 11 subcommittee, chaired by Judge Cawthon,
also presented a proposed plea advisory fom1 to be used by the district courts with the
idea being there should be some uniformity across the state. The form was designed to
be filled out by the defendant with counsel ahead of time and then submitted to the court.
The court would then review it with the defendant. The advantage of such a fonn is
making sure all parties understand the consequences of the plea and putting plea
agreements clearly on the record. This will help on appeal and in post-conviction as
well as when the voluntariness of the plea is challenged. There was discussion as to
whether use of the form should be required and incorporated into a rule or just put in the
bench guide as a recommendation. It was thought that this matter should be brought
before the Administrative Conference to get their recommendation.
While the
Committee wanted some uniformity the members also wanted the district judges to
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endorse its use. The form was based on forms that are now in use by various judges in
different districts.
The Committee then reviewed the form as to content and there was some concern about
questions 17- 22 that addressed performance of defense counsel and whether the
questions would provoke dissatisfaction with defense counsel. The subcommittee was
asked to review the advisory again in the next 10 days and Gar Hackney and Amil
Myshin, as well as Justice Burdick, will participate in that effort with the subcommittee.
It will then be circulated to the Committee. The plea colloquy for felonies that is now in
the bench guide will also be consulted.
Rule 16. Discovery. At the meeting in January the question was raised whether Rule 16
should be amended to require the identification in discovery of witnesses who will be
called as experts and disclosure of the opinions they will render and the basis of those
opinions similar to discovery allowed under the civil rules. The consensus of the
Committee was that better disclosure would be helpful to both the prosecution and
defense and a subcommittee, chaired by Justice Burdick, was appointed. The following
proposal was submitted with some issues still not resolved by the members of the
subcommittee:

Add to Subsection (b):
(7).
Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the defendant the
prosecutor shall provide a written summary or report of any testimony
that the state intends to introduce at trial or hearing pursuant to Rules
702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The summary provided
must describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those
opinions, and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert opinions
regarding mental health shall also comply with the requirements of I.C.
§ 18-207. The prosecution is not required to produce any materials not
subject to disclosure under paragraph (f) of this Rule.
Current subparagraphs (7) and (8) would be re-designated as (8) and
(9), respectively.
Add to Subsection (c):
(4)
Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the prosecutor the
defendant shall provide a written summary or report of any testimony
that the defense intends to introduce at trial or hearing pursuant to
Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The summary
provided must describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons
for those opinions and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of
expert opinions regarding mental health shall also comply with the
requirements of I.C. § 18-207. The defense is not required to produce
any materials not subject to disclosure under paragraph (g) of this
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Rule, or any material otherwise protected from disclosure by his
constitutional rights.

One concern was whether the prosecutor's duty to disclose should be limited to case in
chief and that is an area the subcommittee discussed. Prosecutors were concerned about
when a rebuttal expert would have to be disclosed and whether the state would be unable
to use an expert in rebuttal when it truly could not be anticipated because of a failure to
disclose under this rule. There was also discussion about the level of detail as to the
basis for the opinion and whether it would have to be more than what would be required
to lay a foundation for the testimony at trial.
A question was raised as to why depositions of these experts was not provided for in the
rules but in criminal cases it raises a problem of witness intimidation and of expense
when there are so many indigent defendants.
There was a motion to recommend the adoption of the proposal but it failed with 6 votes
in favor and 7 votes against. After a break to resolve differences, the Committee
considered a new proposal as follows:
Add to Subsection (b):
(7.) Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the defendant the
prosecutor shall provide a written summary or report of any
testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to Rules 702,
703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or bearing. The
summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and
data for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of
expert opinions regarding mental health shall also comply with the
requirements of I.C. § 18-207. The prosecution is not required to
produce any materials not subject to disclosure under paragraph (f)
of this Rule. This subsection does not require disclosure of expert
witnesses, their opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, or the
witness's qualifications, intended only to rebut evidence or theories
that have not been disclosed under this Rule prior to trial.
Current subparagraphs (7) and (8) would be re-designated as (8) and
(9), respectively.
Add to Subsection (c):
(4.) Expert witnesses. Upon written request of the prosecutor the
defendant shall provide a written summary or report of any testimony
that the defense intends to introduce pursuant to Rules 702, 703 or
705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing. The summary
provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and data for
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those opinions and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert
opinions regarding mental health shall also comply with the
requirements of I.C. § 18-207. The defense is uot required to produce
any materials not subject to disclosure under paragraph (g) of this
Rule, or auy material otherwise protected from disclosure by his
constitutional rights.
The Committee voted unanimously to recommend this amendment.

Rule 34. New trial. Rule 34 states that a motion for a new trial may be made at any
time within 14 days of "verdict, finding of guilty or imposition of sentence." A
suggestion was made to simply make it "at any time within 14 days from the imposition
of sentence." However, there are reasons why a defendant may want to make a motion
right after trial before sentencing and it was believed the rule was not causing a problem
as it now reads. A motion passed to leave this rule as it currently reads.
Rule 5.1. Preliminary Hearings. The Committee considered a proposal to consider
changing the time frame set out in Rule 5.l(a) for preliminary hearings from 14 days for
those in custody and 21 days for those not in custody to 21 and 28 days. The reason being
that this is not enough time for discovery and it causes too many continuances.
However, the consensus was that a seven day extension would not solve this problem. It
was also recognized that this often provides an opportunity for a contested bond hearing.
A motion passed to leave this rule as it currently reads.

Rule 5 (h). First appearance on indictment by grand jury. There was a proposal to
amend this rule to provide that a district judge may also arraign a defendant on a grand
jury indictment. This allows any judge to act based on availability. The Committee
voted to recommend the following amendment:
A defendant arrested on a warrant issued pursuant to an indictment by grand jury shall be
taken before a magistrate judge or district court judge in that judicial district without
unreasonable delay. In no event shall the delay be more than twenty-four (24) hours
following the arrest excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. The magistrate judge or
district court judge shall have the authority to set bail and shall advise the defendant:

Rule 33. The Committee voted to recommend a housekeeping amendment to remove
some extra language that appears in the last line of (d) of the rule, as follows:
"The conditions of a withheld judgment or probation may also include, among other
lawful provisions, the following: withholding judgment, conditions."

Inmate requests for disposition of intrastate charges. There was discussion as to
whether a special rule was needed to deal with these requests. The consensus was that
these cases were being resolved in a timely manner and that there was no problem at this
time requiring a special rule. Sara Thomas volunteered to track this for future discussion.
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Probation Violations. There was also discussion as to whether a special rule was
needed to address probation violations. It was noted that these may be treated differently
in different counties. Some do the arraignment in 24 hours excluding holidays and
weekends and actually that is what Rule 5 (b) provides, "Place of initial appearance. A
defendant arrested, whether or not pursuant to a warrant, including a probation violator
arrested on an agents warrant pursuant to I.C. § Section 20-227, shall be taken before a
magistrate in that judicial district without unreasonable delay. In no event shall the delay
be more than twenty-four (24) hours following the arrest excluding Saturdays, Sundays,
and holidays." In some counties it was thought that violators might be sitting and
waiting for a set calendar date dealing with probation violations; however, none of the
members were aware of any specific problems and so no action was taken.
The meeting adjourned at approximately 4:00 p.m.
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